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Abstract 
During the Allied Occupation, Japan imported notable amount of agricultural 
products from the United States through the food aid program, and even once it 
regained its independence, it continued to be a major market for the U.S. 
However, the world food crisis in the early 1970s highlighted the fragility of its 
food supply system and the risks linked to the high dependence on a single 
supplier. This led Japanese authorities to redefine the concept of national 'food 
security' and promote a supply diversification strategy, through investments and 
aid programs in the so-called 'new agricultural countries'. This article examines 
the impact of the 1970s global food crisis on Japan's national security discourse 
and on Japan's international relations. Drawing upon 'securitization theory' and 
'food regime theory', this paper attempts to analyze how the 'food dependence' 
threat was perceived and how this perception influenced diplomatic and policy 
decisions of Japan's government. It will be suggested that these decisions highly 
influenced not only Japan's diplomatic relations but played also an important role 
in the transformation of the postwar international food regime. 
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Securitization, non-traditional security. 
iafor 
The International Academic Forum 
www.iafor.org 
The International Conference on Japan & Japan Studies 2017 Official Conference Proceedings
ISSN: 2432-3918 17
1. Introduction: Japan's "food problem" 
 
Food security has been a crucial issue in Japan's postwar politics, as the food 
self-sufficiency rate of the country has constantly declined since 1945, reaching 
the 39% in 2015, the lowest percentage among industrialized countries (MAFF, 
2015). However, this is by no means a new situation. Concerns about food 
supplies have been a constant element of Japanese politics since the country 
opened its ports to world trade in the second half of 1800s. During the first 
decades of Meiji period, agriculture was the dominant sector in Japanese economy 
and food products accounted for over one third of total volume of exports, but, by 
the beginning of 1890s, Japan found itself obliged to increase food imports as it 
was witnessing a typical Malthusian situation, with the population increasing 
beyond agricultural productivity (Kawashima, 2010, p. 26 and p.165).  
 
After the colonization of Taiwan in 1895 and Korea in 1910, Japanese authorities 
decided to build an empire that was self-sufficient in raw materials, including 
food, in order to limit dependence on food imports. As such, Korea and Taiwan 
were transformed into Japan's "agricultural appendages" (Ho, 1984, p. 350). The 
Japanese strategy significantly altered the agricultural sector of these territories, 
shifting them towards export-oriented food production. Consequently, in the 
period between 1918 and 1932, rice transfers from Korea and Taiwan rose from 
38.8% to 63.2% and from 15.4% to 25.0% respectively, whereas imports from 
other areas decreased from 45.8% to 11.8% (Francks, 2007, p. 170). 
 
The defeat in 1945 put an end to this system and Japan was occupied by the 
Allied Forces. During this time, Japan imported notable amount of agricultural 
products from the United States under the food aid program, and even once it 
regained its independence in 1952, it continued to be a major market for the U.S. 
 
However, the world food crisis that broke out at the beginning of 1970s brought 
back to Japan memories of the first years of the postwar period, when it lost 
access to the resources from colonies, on which it highly depended. This situation 
pushed Japanese authorities to develop a new strategy aimed at guaranteeing a 
stable and secure source of food supply, through a redefinition of the concept of 
"food security". 
 
This paper examines the impact of the 1970s global food crisis on Japan's 
national security discourse and on Japan's international relations. In particular, 
drawing upon "securitization theory" and "food regime theory", it will be 
analyzed how the "food dependence" threat was perceived by Japanese 
authorities and how this perception influenced diplomatic and policy decisions. It 
will be suggested that these decisions highly influenced not only Japan's 
diplomatic relations but played also an important role in the transformation of the 
postwar international food regime.  
 
2. Theoretical framework: 'Food regimes' theory and 'securitization' theory 
 
Food regime theory was first developed by agrarian sociologists Harriet 
Friedmann and Philip McMichael (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989). A simple 
definition of "food regime" is given by Friedmann, who describes the concept as a 
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"rule-governed structure of production and consumption of food on a world scale" 
(Friedmann, 1993, p. 30). The key innovation of this theory has been the 
capability to situate the dynamics of the agri-food sector in a world-historical 
perspective. Friedmann and McMichael identified three global food regimes in 
history.1 The first food regime, also called "colonial diasporic food regime", 
covers the period between 1870 and 1930,2 when, within a general rhetoric of 
free trade and the system of the gold standard, European countries imported cheap 
tropical products such as sugar, coffee, tea and tropical oils, from their colonies 
and from settler states like the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, in 
exchange for capital and manufactured goods (Friedmann, 1992, p. 242). The 
second food regime, called "mercantile food regime", started in the 1950s and 
lasted until the 1973 food crisis. This regime saw the emergence of the United 
States as the new world agricultural power, thanks to the results of agricultural 
policy implemented after the economic depression in the 1930s that increased 
American production, thus generating food surpluses. In order to dispose of 
agricultural surpluses, "food aid" was created as a policy instrument. Foreign 
economic aid was based on the role of the dollar under the Bretton Woods 
monetary system. Within this system, the U.S. started to distribute food surpluses 
to countries that were facing food shortages, such as Europe with the Marshall 
Plan or Japan. Food aid was not only a solution to the domestic agricultural 
situation; it also served as a foreign policy instrument. Particularly in the context 
of Cold War rivalry with the U.S.S.R., it was used as an instrument of 
containment, by strengthening ties with recipient countries (Friedmann, 1993, pp. 
39-42).  
 
During the second food regime, Japan became highly dependent on agricultural 
imports from the United States. The loss of its colonies meant for Japan the loss 
of its principal sources of food and the Japanese experienced a situation of 
deprivation and sacrifice. At the beginning, mass starvation was not considered a 
priority problem by the U.S. government and Japanese alone were made 
responsible for avoiding "acute economic distress" (Fuchs, 2007). However, in 
May 1946, when several protests demanding for food spread quickly around the 
country, Washington agreed to dispatch several ships of rice and wheat to Japan. 
But it was the emergence of the Cold War, around 1947, which led to a significant 
change in the international arena, and also influenced the American occupation 
strategy in the archipelago. The U.S. sought to bring Japan into the anti-Soviet 
line of defense in Asia and gradually abandoned the policy of constraining the 
                                            
1 In their first article (1989), Friedmann and McMichael talked about only two historical 
food regimes, the pre-war and the post-war food regimes. Philip McMichael supposed 
the emergence of a third food regime in 1992, and its main characteristics have been 
analysed in later studies. See: Friedmann, H. (1992). From Colonialism to Green 
Capitalism: Social Movements and Emergence of Food Regimes. Research in rural 
sociology and development 11, pp. 227-264; McMichael, P. (2005). Global Development 
and the Corporate Food Regime. Research in rural sociology and development 11, pp. 
265-299; Pechlaner and Otero. (2010). The Neoliberal Food Regime: Neoregulation and 
the New Division of Labor in North America. Rural sociology 75 (2), pp. 179-208. 
2 In this chapter I make use of McMichael's periodization. Friedmann (2005) prefers to 
date the first food regime between 1870 and 1914, others between 1860 and 1914. See: 
Winders (2009). The Vanishing Free Market. Journal of Agrarian Change 9 (3), pp. 
315-344. 
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Japanese economy. The U.S. helped Japan through two aid-programs: the 
Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) program and the Economic 
Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas (EROA) program. These two programs provided 
Japan with food, raw materials and machinery.  
 
Even once the occupation ended, Japan continued to import agricultural goods 
from the U.S. through food aids. On March 8, 1954, the two governments signed 
the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, under Section 550 of the 
Mutual Security Act of 1951 for the sale of American surplus wheat, valued at $50 
million. 3  On July 7, 1954, the U.S. promulgated the Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance Act, also known as Public Law 480 or PL480 and 
Japan signed two agreements with the United States under this law. The first was 
signed on May 31, 1955 and provided for sales of wheat and barley, as well as 
tobacco and cotton, valued at $85 million. The second was signed on February 10, 
1956 and provided agricultural commodities worth $65.8 million.4 The aim of 
these agreements was twofold: on the one hand, it enabled the U.S. to dispose of 
its agricultural surpluses and Japan to buy the food needed at a convenient price; 
on the other hand, the agreements strengthened the military alliance between the 
two countries, allowing the United States to build up military infrastructure at the 
U.S. bases in Japan and allowing Japan to rebuild its arms industry. Between 1954 
and 1964, Japan received $445 million in PL480 food aid and imported $10.8 
billion of food from conventional trading channels (Moen, 1999: 35). As such, 
Japan became the number one importer of U.S. food and its food self-sufficiency 
rate started to decline steadily.  
 
As we will see more in details later, the second food regime entered into crisis in 
1973, when the world faced the biggest food crisis since 1945. In 1972, in the 
climate of détente, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. made a deal over the sale of wheat 
and other grain commodities. This deal created an unexpected shortage of grain 
on the international market, noticeably pushing food prices up (Luttrell, 1973). 
As such, the main feature of the second food regime - food surpluses - 
disappeared and a new regime emerged. There is some debate in the literature 
about the contours of the third food regime (Friedmann, 2009; Pechlaner and 
Otero, 2009). However, two characteristics deeply distinguish this regime from 
the previous one: (1) the emergence of new centres of food production in 
developing countries (mostly in Latin America and Asia), the so-called "new 
agricultural countries" (N.A.C.s); and (2) the creation of new commercial 
relations led by transnational agribusiness corporations that have undercut the 
ability of single states to regulate their domestic agriculture and trade 
(McMichael, 1992). 
 
"Security" has been defined as an "essentially contested concept" (Buzan, 1983, p. 
6), because it is not objectively definable and inherently disputed. For long time, 
                                            
3 Full text available at: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdfs/A-S38(3)-252.pdf 
4 Full texts available at: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdfs/A-S38(3)-260.pdf; and 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdfs/A-S38(3)-261_1.pdf  
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the discipline of International Relations has associated the concept exclusively 
with the territorial and political integrity of the state (Walt, 1991). In this sense, 
these studies focused mainly on the so-called "traditional" threat, e.g. "military". 
During the 1980s, Critical Studies have challenged this understanding, suggesting 
that there are other "non-traditional" threats such as environmental degradation, 
economic recessions and population growth that cannot be dealt with the 
traditional way.  
 
The Copenhagen School has played a fundamental role in broadening the concept 
of security after the Cold War. The scholars of the School basically argued that 
threats to national security should not only be conceived in military terms, rather 
they should be securitized by the relevant actor before it can be regarded as 
security issue. (Waever, 1989, p 107). In that context, the School has developed a 
framework that can be applied in all areas by focusing on the process of 
classifying a threat, named "theory of securitization" (Waever, 1989, 1995; Buzan, 
de Wilde, Waever, 1998). The School first define the security issue as a problem 
presented as an existential threat to an object to be determined.. According to 
them, securitization is "radically constructivist" and does not question what threat 
really is; rather, the constructivist approach takes a security issue as if made by 
act of securitization. In other words, the scholars of the School underline that: 
"When a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes 
an issue out of what under those conditions is 'normal politics', we have a case of 
securitization" (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998, p. 25). However, presenting 
something as an existential threat is not a securitization. Only when the issue is 
accepted by the audience and emergency measures are authorized to fight that 
threat does the issue becomes entirely securitized. (Buzan, People, State, Fear, p. 
46). In this way, every issue can be transformed into an existential threat and it 
can become the justification to extraordinary measures by the state or other 
securitizing actor 
 
The "food regime theory" and the "securitization theory" are particularly useful to 
assess and understand the impact of 1970s food crisis on Japan's food security 
policies. The historical framework offered by food regime theory will help to 
reveal the main features of the international food system and to understand 
Japanese food dependence from an international perspective and how Japan 
contributed to the maintenance and the change of this system. At the same time, 
the "securitization theory" will be used to describe the process by which Japanese 
authorities have securitized the food issue, making the food dependence from 
imports a threat to Japan's national food security.  
 
3. The 1970s food crisis 
 
At the start of the 1970s, the American economy was hampered by a strong 
inflation. On August 15th 1971, president Richard Nixon announced the New 
Economic Policy, which ended dollar convertibility to gold and implemented a 
price control system. The New Economic Policy marked the beginning of the end 
of the Bretton Woods international monetary system and temporarily halted 
inflation (U.S. Department of State. Office of Historians). However, from January 
1973, consumer prices grew considerably as result of the growth of foodstuffs 
prices. This increase was connected to the rise in meat consumption in Europe and 
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Japan that, in turn, provoked an increase in world demand of grains for fodder. 
But, there was another important event in 1972 that had a significant impact on 
the global relations of food trade and that is remembered with the name of "the 
Great Grain Robbery": it is the grain deal between the U.S. and the U.R.S.S., 
signed on July 1972. According to the food regime theory, this deal can be 
considered as the main cause of the crisis of the postwar food regime (Friedmann, 
1993, p. 99). Because of a bad harvest, at the beginning of 1970s, the Soviet 
Union were obliged to ask help to the United States, the main grain producers in 
the world at that time.  
 
Taking advantage of the ongoing process of détente, Richard Nixon and Henry 
Kissinger used agricultural exports as a major instrument for furthering both farm 
and foreign policy interests, and building a new U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship. In 
July and August 1972 six U.S. export companies contracted with Exportkhleb (the 
Russian trading agency) to sell over 400 million bushels of U.S. wheat valued at 
about 700 million dollar. Each contract was fixed price, calling for shipment of 
U.S. wheat from the 1972-73 crop (USDA, 1974, p. 6). To facilitate the sale of 
U.S. grains, the United States and the Soviet Union signed on July 8, 1972, "the 
largest long-term commercial trade purchase agreement ever made between two 
countries" and the U.R.S.S. agreed to buy a total of $750 million worth of 
American grain during the three-year period beginning August 1, 1972 (U.S. 
Government, 1972, p. 1142). The sales would make the Soviet Union the second 
largest purchaser of American grain, just after Japan (USDA, 1972, p. 145). 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger saw this agreement as "a major step forward in 
the conclusion of more comprehensive arrangements in other fields as well" (U.S. 
Government, 1972, p. 1144). However, the hope for a more comprehensive 
collaboration quickly faded away. The U.S.S.R. purchased the entire contracted 
$750 million worth of grain in the first year of the agreement, using its credits to 
the fullest extent possible. Then, using its hard currency reserve, Moscow bought 
nearly $500 million of additional grain. As result in 1972-73 crop year, the Soviet 
Union bought around 30 million metric tons of grain, which amounted to three 
quarters of all commercially traded grain in the world at that time (Friedmann, 
1993, p. 40). The scale of this transaction was so high that it created a sudden 
shortage in American grain surpluses, which were the pivot of the postwar 
international food regime. Moreover, world food production declined because of 
poor weather conditions worldwide. The consequences were devastating for 
American economy as the surplus shortage sent grain prices soaring, pushing the 
inflation up. For this reason, the U.S. government was to pay large grain 
companies $333 million in export subsidies and over $46 million in shipping 
subsidies to help move the grain to the U.S.S.R (Porter, 1984, p. 6). 
 
As a response to this crisis, Nixon administration imposed several export 
embargoes on agricultural goods between 1973 and 1975. In particular, on June 27, 
1973, Secretary of commerce Fredrick B. Dent, with the approval of the Secretary 
of Agriculture Earl L. Butz, declared "the most dramatic food policy decision of 
1973" (Destler, 1978, p. 627): a complete, temporary embargo on American 
exports of soybeans, cottonseeds, and other agricultural products. In the intentions 
of the government, this decision had the only purpose of controlling food prices at 
home. However, though it proved to be short-lived, it had serious negative impact 
on American foreign policy. The so-called "soybean embargo" "challenged the 
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credibility of the U.S. commitment to free trade among nations and its reputation 
as a reliable supplier" of farm products and the government's failure to 
communicate to its allies its intentions to impose restrictions raised serious doubts 
in Europe and Japan (USGAO, 1974, p. 7). 
 
The post-war food regime based on American surpluses had come to an end. 
 
4. The impact of the crisis on Japan and its response: "resource diplomacy" 
and "comprehensive security" 
 
The 1973 embargo on soybean exports affected Japan significantly, as over 90% 
of the imported soy came from the U.S., while Japan accounted for over 20% of 
American soybean exports (USITC, 1983: 5). The day after the announcement of 
the embargo, the Minister of Agriculture of Japan, Sakarauchi Toshio, and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ōhira Masayoshi, called the U.S. ambassador in 
Japan, Robert Ingersoll, to discuss about soybean embargo. They specifically 
requested Japan be permitted to receive all of the 660 thousands tons of soybeans 
on contract for shipment to Japan between July and September of that year (US 
Department of State, 2005a). Sakurauchi also said that the soybean issue was 
most worrisome because it revived fears about U.S.-Japan trade problems that 
might seriously damage relations between the two countries (Ibidem). Ingersoll, 
for his part, replied that the U.S. would have tried to meet Japan's demand for a 
stable supply of soybeans and he also mentioned that the U.S. Secretary of 
Agriculture Earl Butz had stated that "he would give special consideration to 
agricultural exports to Japan" (Shurtleff, History of soybeans, p. 1711). 
 
As previously mentioned, the embargo proved to be short-lived since it lasted 
only a few days - from June 27 to July 2 - and it was soon replaced by a system of 
export control until October of the same year. From a mere agricultural and 
economic point of view, the embargo did not change Japanese food imports nor 
did it provoke an increase in food prices, but the psychological effects were 
notable. For the first time in the post-war period, Japan understood the fragility of 
its food supply system and the risks associated to heavy dependence on a single 
supplier. In early 1974, Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, during a five-days 
visit in Japan, announced that the embargo on soybean exports was a mistake and 
that the U.S. "should never impose an embargo again" (U.S. Department of State, 
2005b). Also President Nixon admitted that the embargo "might have been good 
for domestic politics" but it was "disastrous" in terms of foreign policy, impairing 
relationship with Japan (U.S. Department of State, 2011, Memorandum 179). 
President Ford as well, during the visit of Japan's Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei 
in Washington on September 21, 1974, and on his visit in Tokyo, on November 19, 
1974, assured Japanese that U.S. was a reliable supplier (Ibidem: Memorandum 
195 and 198). On August 12, 1975, Earl Butz encountered in Washington, DC his 
Japanese counterpart, the Minister of Agriculture and Foresty, Abe Shintarō. The 
document that emerged from this meeting, known as the "Butz-Abe gentlemen's 
agreement", sought to improve the stability of U.S.-Japanese agricultural trade 
relations by setting minimum annual quantities of wheat, feed grains, and 
soybeans that the United States would supply to Japan in the following three years. 
The approximate amount was 3 million metric tons of wheat, 3 million tons of 
soybeans, and 8 million tons of feed grains (USDA, 2009, p. 11). From the U.S. 
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point of view, the Butz-Abe gentlemen's agreement served to attempt to restore 
Japan's confidence in U.S.'s reliability as a supplier of agricultural products. 
However, as we have already pointed out, the embargo had a deep and lasting 
psychological effect. 
 
Japanese government was not only concerned about the economic aspect of food 
dependency, but it was worried also about the use of food as a political and 
diplomatic weapon by the United States. In the August of 1974, a month before 
the World Food Conference held in Rome, a report from CIA came to the 
conclusion that "the U.S.'s near-monopoly position as food exporter would have 
an enormous, though not easily definable, impact on international relations [and] 
(i)t could give the U.S. a measure of power it had never had before" (CIA, 1974, p. 
39). The Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, as well, declared: "Food is a weapon. 
It is now one of the principal tools in our negotiating kit" (Weinstein, 1975). 
 
The 1970s crises (food and energetic) brought back to Japan memories of the first 
years of the postwar period, when it lost access to the resources from colonies, on 
which it highly depended. This situation led the then Prime Minister, Tanaka 
Kakuei, to pursue a more proactive foreign policy, going beyond the framework 
of bilateralism with the United States. From the point of view of agricultural and 
food imports, Japan launched an indipendent and vigorous campaign of "resource 
diplomacy", as a way to re-establish its access to these vital supplies. The 
Japanese government thus decided to launch a food diversification strategy, 
encouraging joint public-private ventures to consolidate alternative food sources. 
During the 1970s and the 1980s, Japan applied the principle of kaihatsu-yunyū 
(literally "development and imports") for Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
projects. One of the main purpose of "resource diplomacy" was to enhance 
"comprehensive security". These two concepts have been the subject of a vast and 
rich literature but they have seldom been applied to food imports and food 
security, as most of these studies have focused on oil and energy imports 
(Nakajima, 2015; Shiratori, 2015; Morse, 1981). Hereafter, we will attempt to 
analyze the two concepts from the point of view of Japan's food security policies.  
  
The concept of "comprehensive security" broadened the traditional meaning of 
"security", putting emphasis on economic and diplomatic means for pursuing 
national security. As it was pointed out, Japan was an "economic giant" but with a 
big limitation of resources. The expression "comprehensive security" emerged in 
Japan at the beginning of 1970s, when the oil and food crises enhanced the 
perception of insecurity due to the a high dependence from external markets,  
 
During the 1970s, many governmental reports about the redifinition of national 
security were published. 5  But it was in 1978, when prime minister Ōhira 
established the Research Group for Comprehensive Security, that it was 
systematically developed. In 1980, the Group published its final report (Report on 
Comprehensive Security).6 The report put the accent on the changes that took 
                                            
5 Among them, we can cite these reports published by the Minister of Industry and Trade: 'A 
vision on the resource problem (shigen gaikō no tenbō), 1971; 'Our country economic security 
(wagakuni keizai anzen hoshō)', 1974; 'Research about Japan's economic security (Nihon 
keizai sekyuritei ni kan suru kenkyū)', 1974. 
6 The full text in Japanese is available at:   
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place in the international system since World War II, and also sought to widen the 
concept of national security. The report suggested that national security needed to 
be considered as «the protection of people's life from external threats» and not 
only as the protection from military invasion. In this perspective, the report 
mentioned six areas of national security, and one of these was food security. 
According to the report, the main threats to Japan's national food security were: 
interruption of food supplies (such as embargoes), bad harvests in producing 
countries, bad diplomatic relations between producing and consuming countries, 
increasing of world population. The report suggested that, in order to achieve 
national food security, it was not sufficient to increase national production and to 
have good relations with producing countries, but Japan should have also 
diversified its food suppliers, by investing in the so-called "new agricultural 
countries (N.A.Cs)", through direct investments and development aids, increasing 
world food production.  
 
In the light of this document, it is easy to understand how "resource diplomacy" 
was an instrument used by Japanese government for achieving national food 
security. Japanese authorities used ODA funds to promote agricultural 
development in developing countries (Hilmann and Rotherberg, 1988, pp. 46-7) 
and, through tax incentives, the government tried to help Japanese agribusiness 
corporations to invest in these countries in order to produce food to import to 
Japan (Hongo and Hosono, 2012, p. 3). The most famous of these projects is 
probably the PRODECER, a 22-year program started in 1979 for the development 
of soybean production in Cerrado, a vast area in central Brazil. The Japanese 
government provided 28 billion yen of ODA for the transformation of over 
334,000 hectares of Cerrado into soybean farmland. 7  Thanks to Japanese 
investments, in few years, Brazil became one the principal producers of soybean 
and recently it has become the first soybean exporter in the world, pushing the 





After the defeat in 1945 and the loss of its colonies, Japan became highly 
dependent on food and agricultural imports from the United States. But it was 
only in 1973, after the soybean embargo, that Japanese authorities started to 
consider this dependency as a threat and to securitize the food issue. As it has 
been pointed out, the embargo never affected Japan's supply nor there was any 
kind of food shortage, for this reason in this article we claimed that the threat 
posed by the embargo - and, more in general, by the dependency from food 
imports - was more a perception than a real one. 
 
Through the development of the concept of "comprehensive security", the 
government made food security an integral part of the strategy to ensure national 
security. As we have seen, the "resource diplomacy" was the instrument 
implemented to achieve the "comprehensive security". In particular, from the 
point of view of food security, Japan played a primary role in the transformation 
                                                                                                                             
http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/JPSC/19800702.O1J.html 
7 See: http://www.maff.go.jp/j/kokusai/kokkyo/toushi/pdf/1304mgj4.pdf 
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of the international system of food trade and tried to preserve its own food 
security by the diversification of food supplies and investment in new food 
production in every corner of the globe, posing a major challenge to U.S. 
supremacy in food exports. This last aspect will undoubtedly merit consideration 
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